Grave breaches, violations and tortious derogation of absolute fundamental rights and freedoms of paramount international treaty law claims:
Australian Human Rights Commission case reference: 2021-27043.
“The Commission facilitated conciliation discussions with both parties in the period December 2022 to March 2023.” The originating complaint form dual criteria grounds claimed by the Applicant was that his (1) “human rights have been breached by a Commonwealth Government agency” and he has (2) “been treated unfairly because of another reason, including victimisation,” could not be resolved as there was “no reasonable prospect of the matter being settled by conciliation” with the Respondent.
“When the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) applied to have access to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) CCTV video and audio recordings of the very proceedings in which the aggrieved’s rights were violated so brazenly, that request was also denied and that this too was allegedly not appealable. Of course, we know that this is false also, however, it’s extremely time consuming and costly to litigate the Commonwealth or State (DPP and armed police) in court and that’s why (cognitively impaired) public officials become emboldened to continue such unconscionable, unlawful grave breaches and malicious misconduct, as they know that not even Parliament or a higher court will rule unbiased, without fear or favor.”
The notice of termination of complaint was given by the President of the Australian Human Rights Commission on the 14 March 2023.
Commonwealth Ombudsman Iain Anderson made a number of recommendations in his (2019-2024) investigation report into the use of force by ACT police.
“By not reliably collecting audio and visual [body-worn camera and CCTV] evidence, ACT Policing is failing to comply with the law and undermining the legislative intent of promoting accountability and protecting the safety of both police officers and members of the community,” the ombudsman’s report said.
Police ‘failing to comply with law’ on use of body-worn cameras. A recommendation was made for improving the use of body-worn cameras to ensure reliable audio and visual evidence is collected.
“Outrageous unlawful use of force… A strong message must be sent that this behaviour will not be tolerated.” – The Commonwealth Ombudsman.
Source: (ABC News: Matt Roberts) https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-06-10/use-of-force-escalated-by-act-police-one-third-cases/105395222
Commonwealth Ombudsman Report: Investigation into ACT Policing’s use of force 2019-2024, June 2025. Media release – 9 June 2025.
https://www.ombudsman.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0031/318595/ACT-Policing-Use-of-Force-Media-Release.pdf
:For the facts of the matter:
“Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored!” ~ Aldous Huxley.
The Applicant (aggrieved) claims that the grave breaches, violations and derogation of fundamental rights and freedoms complained of is unlawful in accordance with article(s) 2.3(a)(b)(c), 4.2, 9.5, 14.6 and 14.7 of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRCA), Schedule 2, (Australian Treaty Series 1980 No. 23) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), Bill of Rights (1688), 1 Wm. and Mary c. 2 [ACT & Imp], Sect. 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, inter alia, and under ‘Legislation’, the Commonwealth of Australia is a signatory to (binding on all states and territories) under the international treaties and acts listed:
- (Australian Treaty Series 1980 No. 23) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) scheduled to the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRCA); article(s) 4.2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12.1, 14.6, 17, 22, 23.1 and 26 of the ICCPR; N.B. Art. 4.2 Non derogable and absolute rights, such as Art. 7, 8.1 & 8.2 Freedom from slavery and servitude;
- Customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) scheduled to the Geneva Conventions Act (GCA) 1957 (Cth), Sch. 4, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, article(s) 3, 27, 30, 31, 32, 144, 146 and 147; also The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, 2006 at [§ 13.8–13.9]; rule(s) 2, 25, 27, 30, 31, 47, 52, 54, 90, 92, 93, 99, 105, 138, 143, 151, 152, and 156 of the IHL (international law universal jurisdiction);
- (Australian Treaty Series 1989 No. 21) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), article 4;
- Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) (entered into force on 20 January 2018 (Cth)), article 4;
- (Australian Treaty Series 1910 No. 8) International Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) [The Hague Convention (IV)], article(s) 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 55 and 56;
- (Australian Treaty Series 2002 ATS 15) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court scheduled to the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth) (ICC), Art. 6, 7, 8, Genocide;
- (Australian Treaty Series 1974 No. 2) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 26, 27 and 62 (Internal law and observance of treaties ~ “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”); inter alia.
Internal law and observance of treaties:
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
The Rushton v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 1357, ACD 22 of 2023 case was then abruptly summarily dismissed by the Federal Court of Australia at the Interlocutory hearing on the 22 September 2023 with Justice Bromwich (former Assistant Director of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP), clearly a perceived and actual s. 72(ii.) ‘judicial misbehaviour, appointment, tenure and remuneration’ conflicts of interest with visceral fear and favor that indicated an animus towards the respondent injured applicant apprehended, in tune with the apparent bias that contaminated the matter, therefore requesting recusal and disqualification by claiming “extreme apprehended bias several times during the Interlocutory hearing” to no avail; cf. QYFM [255-256]) opinion [contrary to irrefutable evidence of well established stare decisis case law cited in binding cases such Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia [1991] HCA 32; 172 CLR 501, at [32], [36] and recently reaffirmed in Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Patterson [2024] VCC 487, at [66-106] and The Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), sec. 39B (1) “Original jurisdiction… “the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia includes jurisdiction with respect to any matter in which… an injunction is sought against an officer or officers of the Commonwealth.”) “no engagement of Federal jurisdiction” and “no judicial foundation to proceed” to hear and determine ‘the victim’s enforceable right to compensation for the unlawful arrest and detention‘ and ‘improperly and illegally obtained evidence‘ taken by armed force during the ‘torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading‘ ‘treatment in detention‘ grave breaches, violations and derogation of fundamental rights and freedoms of the ICCPR and Australian nemo dat rule of law claims of the registered and protected Intellectual Property (IP) Exclusive Right Trade Mark (biometric data) legal estate title proprietary, prerogative and registered business name private personal property holder (recorded with the Commonwealth patents, trade marks, registered designs and copyrights office) and the secured party, Super Priority Purchase Money Security Interest(s) (PMSI) (recorded with the Commonwealth Registrar’s office of the Attorney-General) of the animo revertendi claimant, with the Applicant also claiming constitutional exemption with the absolute prerogative inherent ‘rights, privileges, and immunities, the inalienable birthright and heritage of every British subject’ in right of the Crown absolute [cf. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW & Imp.), s.12 Compassing etc.], ‘humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God’ in accordance with the ‘indissoluble Federal Commonwealth Constitution‘ and Common Law in perpetuity [cf. Baker v The Queen [2004] HCA 45 at [140]; South Australia v The Commonwealth [1942] HCA 14; 65 CLR 373, p. 408] and extreme apprehended bias of the Court that acted and made outrageous irrational fiction of law fraudulent statements in bad faith with error of law and fact on the face of the record, that contaminated the matter, ‘continuing-violations due to discriminatory acts which have been occurring over a period of time’ with the Courts trustee devastavit and constructive fraud on the beneficiaries legal estate title proprietary (recorded with the Office of the Registrar General for New South Wales (Commonwealth) Crown Lands), prerogative and registered business name. cf. Commonwealth v New South Wales [1923] HCA 34 (1923) 33 CLR 1 at [45–46], Lord Haldane “the title of the Sovereign is a pure legal estate, to which beneficial rights may or may not be attached” and “by that superior law is vested in the Commonwealth; and, as that superior law is the sole source of title, it follows that nothing henceforth can depend on State registration laws or State laws of any kind.“; British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2 at [104, 139-140]; Commonwealth of Australia v Davis Samuel Pty Limited and Ors (No 11) [2017] ACTSC 2, Refshauge J at [104–110, 116]; Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd [2018] HCA 12 at [63] As Brennan J said in Gould v Vaggelas [96], “[a] knave does not escape liability because he is dealing with a fool [the Knave lies and acts as the exploiter (aggressor) to mislead, the Fool lies and acts as the victim (naive), both irreconcilable foes to truth; If you can bear to hear the truth you’ve spoken twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools…”
- Article 26 “Pacta sunt servanda – Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”
- Article 27 “Internal law and observance of treaties – A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
[In Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Patterson [2024] VCC 487, at [66-106] Her Honor Judge Liz Gaynor ruled at [66] “[armed] police used unnecessary and unwarranted force and violence“. [69] “I am satisfied that [armed Police] Officers… were the aggressors in the situation and that they employed unjustified violence.” Her Honor ruled at [94] “on its face that [police] evidence is inadmissible” and at [92] “I am satisfied that by their unlawful violence police instigated the response by the [unarmed] accused which underlies the charges…”
[101] “In relation to… the unlawfulness of the arrest of [the unarmed accused] referring to the Charter of Human Rights, specifically ss21 and 22. Section 21 deals with the right to liberty and security. S21(2) states a person must not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. I am satisfied that in the way that [armed] police behaved towards [the unarmed accused], he was subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.” [102] Further s21(3) states a person must not be deprived of that person’s liberty except on grounds and in accordance with procedures established by law. I am satisfied that [armed] police failed to have regard to the grounds and procedures established by law in the way they arrested…”
[104] “…the difficulty of obtaining the evidence without the impropriety. In my view this evidence would not have come into existence but for the [armed Police] impropriety I have found. [105] “In all the circumstances I am satisfied that the evidence was obtained in consequence of an impropriety [s138(3)(f) ‘or contravention was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights set out in Schedule 2 to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 of the Commonwealth’] and it is also my view the undesirability of admitting this evidence obtained as it was as a direct result of unlawful [armed] police violence outweighs the desirability of admitting it.” [106] “As I have said, I rule that this evidence is inadmissible at trial. That includes both the video footage and the statements by [armed] police.“]
And ”under international law universal jurisdiction treaties that the Commonwealth of Australia is a signatory to (binding on all states and territories), under the international treaties and acts for grave breaches of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law by a “Commonwealth Government agency”, in accordance with the following articles:
- (Australian Treaty Series 1910 No. 6), International Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts [Hague II, International Arbitration Rules of War]; [International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), Sect. 16.] “Any alleged debt and all claims to contract are disputed, cease and desist immediately” [in accordance with 15 U.S. Code § 1692g(b)]:
- Article 1 – The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of another country as being due to its subjects or citizens.
- Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth.), Sect. 270.1 defines the term ‘slavery‘ as “the condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including where such a condition results from a debt or contract made by the person.” Div. 80.2D Advocating genocide. Division .268 – Genocide, by forcibly transferring (trafficking, kidnapping, hostage-taking) children, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against the administration of justice of the International Criminal Court – Sub. Div. B, 268.4 (genocide harm), 268.7 (genocide transfer); Sub. Div. C, Crimes against humanity, s.268.10 (enslavement), 268.11 (forcible transfer), 268.12 (imprisonment), 268.13 (torture), 268.20 (persecution), 268.23 (inhumane act), 268.76 (due process); 268.89 (displace civilians), 268.94 (seizing property), 270.5 (servitude); 270.7C (debt-bondage); Div. 270 – Slavery and slavery-like offences; Div. 271 – Trafficking in persons and debt bondage with intention to “deceive mislead as to fact or as to law, by words or other conduct” is a criminal offence with a “penalty: imprisonment for 12 years.”; Div. 134 – Obtaining property or a financial advantage by deception; s.137.2 False or misleading documents; s.142.2. Abuse of public office, “(ii) dishonestly causing a detriment to another person”, inter alia.
‘Crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes (under conventional and customary regulation of armed conflicts), and torture are international crimes which have risen to the level of jus cogens (“the compelling law”) standing and are deemed to be ‘‘peremptory’’ and nonderogable’ [fn. 40, 58]. Under international law, these obligations are to be considered as obligatio erga omnes (“obligations flowing to all”, that is, binding on all states), the consequence of which is that impunity cannot be granted, and universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of such crimes’ [fn. 41, 51, 89], in accordance with the National measures to repress violations of international humanitarian law (Civil law systems), Geneva, 23-25 September 1997, ISBN 2-88145-114-4; International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth) (ICC Act) ~ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 6, 7, 8, Genocide; International Humanitarian Law (IHL), rule 156 “Definition of War Crimes.” Cf. Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia [1991] HCA 32.
Binding Precedent Case Law Authority
Maxim of law: Stare decisis et non quieta movere, witch means “maintain what has been decided; not alter that which has been (precedent) established.”
In Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia and Another [1991] HCA 32; 172 CLR 501; BRENNAN J. said at [32], [36], [39-44]; McHUGH J. said at [32.]
BRENNAN J. [32.] ‘However, I need not and I do not rest my judgment on this view for there is a further argument which depends simply on the existence of a universal jurisdiction to try international crimes. In the way in which this argument was first put by the Commonwealth, the Act was said to be a law adapted and appropriate to the exercise of a right which international law specially confers on each nation to try those charged with the commission of international crimes, especially war crimes. At first, the submission made by the Commonwealth identified the right to try as a right to try allegations of guilt of crimes defined by international law, albeit that definition was adopted by municipal law and applied as such.’
[36.] International law recognizes certain international crimes in respect of which any country may exercise criminal jurisdiction regardless of the citizenship or residence of the alleged offender or of the place where the offence was committed: Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed., vol.18, par.1529; Professor Green, “International Crimes and the Legal Process”, (1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 567, at p 568. Brownlie, op cit, p 305, states the principle in this way:
“It is now generally accepted that breaches of the laws of war, and especially of the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1949, may be punished by any state which obtains custody of persons suspected of responsibility. This is often expressed as an acceptance of the principle of universality, but this is not strictly correct, since what is punished is the breach of international law; and the case is thus different from the punishment, under national law, of acts in respect of which international law gives a liberty to all states to punish, but does not itself declare criminal.” Piracy is an older example of a crime under international law as war crimes now are. Indeed, one author has described war crimes as “international crimes par excellence” (Van den Wijngaert, “War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Statutory Limitations” in Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, vol.3, (1987), p 91). In re List (Hostages Trial) (1948) 15 Annual Digest 632, at p 636, the United States Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg said:
“An international crime is such an act universally recognized as criminal, which is considered a grave matter of international concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control over it under ordinary circumstances. The inherent nature of a war crime is ordinarily itself sufficient justification for jurisdiction to attach in the courts of the belligerent into whose hands the alleged criminal has fallen.“
[39.] … ‘Professor Lauterpacht (“The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes“, (1944) XXI The British Year Book of International Law 58, at pp 65-67) held the opinion that the law which must be applied in connection with the prosecution and punishment of war criminals is primarily the law of nations and that, by applying the law of nations, municipal legislation providing for the trial of war criminals avoids the reproach of retroactivity and breach of the principle nullum crimen sine lege [“no crime without law” – principal that one cannot be punished for doing something that is not prohibited by law]. He wrote: “Once it is realized that the offenders are being prosecuted, in substance, for breaches of international law, then any doubts due to inadequacy of the municipal law of any given State determined to punish war crimes recede into the background.’
[40.] … ‘Subsequently, the municipal law was amended by making punishable war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Baxter, “The Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction over War Crimes”, (1951) XXVIII The British Year Book of International Law 382, at p 384).’
[41.] … “War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity”. The Nuremberg Tribunal observed, (1947) 41 The American Journal of International Law 172, at p 248:
“The Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the definition which it gives both of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. With respect to War Crimes, however, as has already been pointed out, the crimes defined by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter were already recognized as War Crimes under international law. They were covered by Articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, and 51 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 [replaced by the third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention III)]. That violation of these provisions constituted crimes for which the guilty individuals were punishable is too well settled to admit of argument.“
[44.] “Legal opinion at the time seems to have been that jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war existed, and that there was a need to legislate only to empower the domestic courts to utilise the jurisdiction which was already available under international law.”
It follows that it is no objection to the validity of the Act that it selects the ordinary courts of the States and Territories as the tribunals for the trial of persons charged with “a war crime”.
McHUGH J. said at [32.] ‘The Act is a valid enactment under s.51(xxix) and (xxxix) of the Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12, s. 51(vi), (xxix), Ch. III—War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth)).
[“The Constitution of this republic should make the special privilege for medical freedom as well as religious freedom. Unless we put medical freedom into the constitution the time will come when medicine will organise into an undercover dictatorship and force people who wish doctors and treatment of their own choice to submit to only what the dictating outfit offers.” Quote attributed to Benjamin Rush, MD, a Founding Father of the United States who signed the United States Declaration of Independence and personal physician to George Washington, and authored one of the first major essays against slavery in the Colonies (in 1773).]
Subsequent Precedent Case Law Authority
In the monumental case Johnston v Commissioner of Police [2024] QSC 2 [Johnston & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) & Anor; Witthahn & Ors v Wakefield (Chief Executive of Hospital and Health Services and Director General of Queensland Health); Sutton & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service)[2024] QSC 2]; The Honourable Justice Glenn Martin AM SJA. in judgment summary found that:
In late 2021 and early 2022 directions were issued by the Commissioner of Police and Dr John Wakefield (the Director-General of the Department of Health). The directions covered employees in the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and the Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) and required employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations and booster doses. If an employee did not comply with the relevant direction then the employee was liable to disciplinary sanctions up to and including termination of employment.
Section 58 (“Conduct of public entities”) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD) makes it unlawful for the Commissioner or the Director-General to make a decision that is not compatible with human rights or to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right.
The Commissioner, in making the decision to issue the directions, failed to give proper consideration to human rights relevant to the decision. Although she was provided with Human Rights Compatibility Assessments she did not consider them before making the directions. As a result, the decisions and the directions were unlawful.
- (a) although each of the directions limited the rights under s 17 (“Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment“) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD) because each direction had the effect of requiring an employee to undergo medical treatment (a vaccination) without the employee’s full, free and informed consent…
Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD), s 17 Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
A person must not be—
(a)subjected to torture; or
(b)treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; or
(c)subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s full, free and informed consent.
In the QPS case, orders were made declaring the QPS directions to be unlawful and the Commissioner was restrained from taking any steps with respect to those directions. In the QAS case, orders were made declaring the QAS direction to be of no effect and the Director-General was restrained from taking any steps with respect to those directions.
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee (06.03.2025).
Source: https://youtu.be/ll_J3uPzDQ0?si=jXpNj0tYfcUgFn7P
In the monumental case Johnston v Commissioner of Police [2024] QSC 2, The Honourable Justice Glenn Martin found at [296, 329-331, 378-379, 469]: [as cited in the ‘Originating application under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986’ and ‘Written Submissions’ but on the contrary summarily dismissed by Justice Bromwich (former Assistant Director of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP)) in Rushton v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 1357, ACD 22 of 2023 in the Federal Court of Australia (set out above).]
[296] In HRCA No. 1 the discrimination (explicit in Direction No. 12) against those with a conscientious objection was identified in the following way: “Under s 15(2) of the Human Rights Act, police officers and staff members have a right to enjoy their human rights without discrimination. As will be seen below, discrimination may include discrimination on the basis of conscientious belief. The direction distinguishes between people with a religious objection and people with a conscientious objection in the context of vaccination, by providing an exemption for religious objection only. This involves providing discriminatory enjoyment of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief in s 20 of the Human Rights Act.”
[329] In British Medical Association v The Commonwealth104 the High Court considered… a form of civil conscription.
[330] Latham CJ said: “… This is a very real power of compulsion. There are various ways of compelling people to a course of action. The imposition of a penalty or imprisonment is a common form of compulsion.”105 His Honour went on to say: “There could in my opinion be no more effective means of compulsion than is to be found in a legal provision that unless a person acts in a particular way he shall not be allowed to earn his living in the way, and possibly in the only way, in which he is qualified to earn a living.”106 To similar effect Webb J said: “To require a person to do something which he may lawfully decline to do but only at the sacrifice of the whole or a substantial part of the means of his livelihood would, I think, be to subject him to practical compulsion amounting to conscription in the case of services required by Parliament to be rendered to the people.”107
[331] The decision in British Medical Association has been the subject of consideration in General Practitioners Society in Australia v Commonwealth108 and Wong v Commonwealth109 where the meaning of “civil conscription” was reconsidered. … the general principle enunciated by Latham CJ (set out above) was not disturbed. These cases are concerned with the prohibition in s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution against civil conscription. [cf. Constitution of Australia (Cth), s 51(xxiiiA) “The provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances:”]
[378] “I respectfully agree with that analysis. It is consistent with the balance of s 29 [“Right to liberty and security of person”]. To extend it as is sought by Johnston would be to unnecessarily multiply the right to bodily integrity already protected by s 17(c) [“Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”] and s 25(a) [“Privacy and reputation”] of the HRA. [379] “This right is not limited.”
[469] I make the following orders: “(a)(i) The Court declares that Instrument of Commissioner’s Direction No. 12 issued on 7 September 2021 and Instrument of Commissioner’s Direction No. 14 issued on 14 December 2021 were unlawful under s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019.” (c)(i) The Court declares that Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements Human Resources Policy is of no effect.“
In Benton v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. [2022] Case No. 1:22-CV-00118;A federal jury in Tennessee verdict order [dated 28.06.2024] awarded Tanja Benton, a former employee of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee (BCBST), over $680,000 after it found the insurance company “did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that it had offered a reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff or that it could not reasonably accommodate the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs without undue hardship” when she was fired for refusing its COVID-19 vaccination mandate.
[‘An egregious violation‘ ~ Augusto Zimmermann is professor and head of law at Sheridan Institute of Higher Education and served as associate law dean at Murdoch University. He is also a former commissioner with the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia and writes: “A medical treatment which is imposed upon a person without his or her informed consent is a trespass upon that person. In Bowater v Rowley Regis Corp (1944), Lord Justice Scott explained that consent to treatment, including vaccination, is needed to proceed with the treatment:
… a man cannot be said to be truly “willing” unless he is in a position to choose freely, and freedom of choice predicates, not only full knowledge of the circumstances on which the exercise of choice is conditioned, so that he may be able to choose wisely, but in the absence from his mind of any feeling of restraint so that nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will.
In 2009, in Wong v Commonwealth; Selim v Professional Services Review Committee, Chief Justice French and Justice Gummow held that civil conscription is a “compulsion or coercion in the legal and practical sense, to carry out work or provide [medical] services”.
It is also worth approaching the matter from the perspective of the self-determination of individuals. This was highlighted in Airdale National Health Service Trust v Bland (1993), when Lord Judge Goff remarked at 866:
[I]t is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the wishes of the patient, so that, if an adult patient of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his life would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do so: To this extent, the principle of sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination. Full reaction article here.
Constitutional separation of powers a ‘fiction’
The impartiality of the Federal Court is in question in light of allegations that a judge concealed her connections to pharmaceutical giant Pfizer before dismissing a legal challenge over its Covid vaccine.
“Judges are duty bound to disclose not only potential conflicts, but also perceived conflicts. Failing to disclose this information is not just a breach of common courtesy, but is a breach of the judicial obligations of a sitting judge,” said Ashby-Koppens.
But this is a fiction, Professor of Law at Sheridan Institute of Higher Education, Augusto Zimmermann told me. “There is no such a thing as separation of powers,” he said. “Australian judges are chosen by the government of the day. This obviously makes every judicial appointment inevitably political in nature and makes accountability impossible to achieve.” Full reaction article here.]
The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758) – EMMERICH DE VATTEL
BOOK 2, CHAPTER 12
Of Treaties of Alliance, and Other Public Treaties
§ 163. Obligation of observing treaties.
It is a settled point in natural law, that he who has made a promise to any one has conferred upon him a real right to require the thing promised, — and, consequently, that the breach of a perfect promise is a violation of another person’s right, and as evidently an act of injustice as it would be to rob a man of his property. The tranquillity, the happiness, the security of the human race, wholly depend on justice, — on the obligation of paying a regard to the rights of others. The respect which others pay to our rights of domain and property constitutes the security of our actual possessions; the faith of promises is our security for things that cannot be delivered or executed upon the spot. There would no longer be any security, no longer any commerce between mankind, if they did not think themselves obliged to keep faith with each other, and to perform their promises. This obligation is, then, as necessary as it is natural and indubitable, between nations that live together in a state of nature, and acknowledge no superior upon earth, to maintain order and peace in their society. Nations, therefore, and their conductors, ought inviolably to observe their promises and their treaties. This great truth, though too often neglected in practice, is generally acknowledged by all nations:4 the reproach of perfidy is esteemed by sovereigns a most atrocious affront yet he who does not observe a treaty is certainly perfidious, since he violates his faith. On the contrary, nothing adds so great a glory to a prince, and to the nation he governs, as the reputation of an inviolable fidelity in the performance of promises.
§ 164. The violation of a treaty is an act of injustice.
As the engagements of a treaty impose on the one hand a perfect obligation, they produce on the other a perfect right. The breach of a treaty is therefore a violation of the perfect right of the party with whom we have contracted; and this is an act of injustice against him.
BOOK 2, CHAPTER 15
Of the Faith of Treaties
§ 221. He who violates his treaties, violates the law of nations.
He who violates his treaties, violates at the same time the law of nations; for, he disregards the faith of treaties, — that faith which the law of nations declares sacred; and, so far as depends on him, he renders it vain and ineffectual. Doubly guilty, he does an injury to his ally, he does an injury to all nations, and inflicts a wound on the great society of mankind. “On the observance and execution of treaties,” said a respectable sovereign, “depends all the security which princes and states have with respect to each other: and no dependence could henceforward be placed in future conventions if the existing ones were not to be observed.” Psa. 94:22.
§ 222. Right of nations against him who disregards the faith of treaties.
As all nations are interested in maintaining the faith of treaties, and causing it to be everywhere considered as sacred and inviolable, so likewise, they are justifiable in forming a confederacy for the purpose of repressing him who testifies a disregard for it, — who openly sports with it, — who violates and tramples it under foot. Such a man is a public enemy who saps the foundations of the peace and common safety of nations. But we should be careful not to extend this maxim to the prejudice of that liberty and independence to which every nation has a claim. When a sovereign breaks his treaties, or refuses to fulfill them, this does not immediately imply that he considers them as empty names, and that he disregards the faith of treaties: he may have good reasons for thinking himself liberated from his engagements; and other sovereigns have not a right to judge him. It is the sovereign who violates his engagements on pretenses that are evidently frivolous, or who does not even think it worth his while to allege any pretense whatever, to give a colorable gloss to his conduct, and cast a veil over his want of faith, — it is such a sovereign who deserves to be treated as an enemy to the human race.
Customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) scheduled to the Geneva Conventions Act (GCA) 1957 (Cth); also The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, 2006 at [§ 7.3]; Practice relating to Rule 65. Perfidy of the IHL (international law universal jurisdiction) states:
Perfidy is forbidden. Acts which constitute perfidy are those inviting the confidence of an adversary, thus leading that adversary to believe that there is an entitlement, or an obligation, to accord protection provided under the LOAC, with an intent to betray that confidence. – Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 7.3.
Rule 65. Definition of Perfidy
- Additional Protocol I defines perfidy as “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence”.[14] This definition is restated in the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth) (ICC Act).[15] It is also contained in numerous military manuals.[16] The essence of perfidy is thus the invitation to obtain and then breach the adversary’s confidence, i.e., an abuse of good faith. This requirement of a specific intent to breach the adversary’s confidence sets perfidy apart from an improper use, making perfidy a more serious violation of international humanitarian law. Some military manuals translate this rule as follows: it is prohibited to commit a hostile act under the cover of a legal protection.[20]
- Perfidy: (to deceive) “The act of one who has engaged his faith (oath) to do a thing, and does not do it, but does the contrary.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1st Ed. Perfidy refers to deliberate or intentional breach of faith or calculated violation of trust. Perfidy means faithlessness, treachery, violation of a promise (oath) or vow or a trust reposed. [Streeter v. Emmons cty. Farmers press, 57 N.D. 438, 445 (N.D. 1928); Crimes Act 1958 (VIC) – Sect. 180 and Criminal Code 1899 (QLD) – Sect. 442F Secret commission in return for substituted appointment of Estate Trustee.]
- Perfidy is the deliberately deceitful act of falsely making a promise, a vow, allegience (oath) or agreement for the purpose of gaining proximity and trust in order to undertake an act of treachery and great injury. Perfidy is one of the most heinous acts against the law and society in that a person deliberately uses the good faith and trust of others against them, thus creating confusion, further mistrust and turmoil.
“In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.” – George Orwell.
To assist further research and prosecution against the impunity granted for the relentless repugnant vultures legal lawfare, grave breaches of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, and universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of such crimes, in accordance with the National measures to repress violations of international humanitarian law (Civil law systems), please donate, thank you!
“The Last Sentry at the Gate“, Billionaire Clive Palmer, the Chairman of the United Australia Party, who reportedly contributed between $2.5 to $3 million towards funding for the counter of the Goliath lawfare suits, said; “We have had a great victory for all Australians, especially those who were illegally coerced into taking the vaccine.” “We can celebrate because this is the first precedent in the western world where a trial has gone the full distance and the court has found a trampling of human rights,” Palmer said outside the supreme court in Brisbane.
“What’s more uncertain is the people who have died, the class action won’t do much for those people that have taken the vaccine and have perished.” “We could look at the class action for the ambulance workers and the police workers who have been subjected to harassment by their colleagues at the police department on the direction of the government to try to drop this case,” he told the press outside the Brisbane Supreme Court after the decision was handed down.
Condemning the government for its “coercion and bullying,” Palmer paid tribute to the police and healthcare workers for their “extreme courage” in resisting the Covid vaccine workplace directives.
From day one Clive Palmer spoke up for informed choice and spoke out against coercion. Not only that, he put his money behind his views with a string of activities and events. One such event was the Covid-19 Vaccine & Effects tour around Australia in early 2023. The tour featured Dr Melissa McCann, Dr Pierre Kory and Dr Peter McCullough. Clive Palmer’s speech at the Sydney event was one for the ages. CLICK HERE to watch.
One Nation Senator Pauline Hanson described the ruling as an “important victory in the fight for freedom and human rights in Australia. I said from the start they contravened s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution, which prohibits (any form of) civil conscription through the provision of medical services.”
“You didn’t care the individual freedoms and rights you were supposed to defend and protect were under attack. You relished the power state governments were taking from their citizens. You cheered them on! You were wrong! One Nation was right because we were standing up for the individual freedoms and constitutional authority that underpin Australian democracy. You didn’t, and you attacked us for it. You were wrong. Only a Royal Commission can compel the secret advice that led to these unlawful vaccine mandates…” she told the Senate in the Federal Parliament of Australia after hearing the ruling.
The judgment represented the first time sections of the Human Rights Act had been tested in the supreme court, blazing a precedent for future cases.
In Shearer v Chief Commissioner of Police (Victoria) [2024] VSC 181 (19 April 2024), the Honourable Judge McDonald J Conclusion found at [73] “The plaintiff’s failure to receive any dose of COVID-19 vaccine by 16 August 2022 did not constitute a breach of the Victoria Police Manual (VPM). Consequently, the Disciplinary Inquiry Officer (DIO) did not have power to reprimand the plaintiff for a breach of discipline. Further, the plaintiff was denied procedural fairness.”
[74] “The Court shall order that the decision of the defendant made 9 December 2022 finding the Charge of failing to comply with the Chief Commissioner’s instructions proven and reprimanding him pursuant to s 132(1)(a) of the Victoria Police Act 2013 be quashed (‘– that is to say, it is declared completely invalid, so that no one need respect it with an order in the nature of ‘certiorari (Latin for “to be made more certain”) an original writ, issuing out of the court of chancery or the king’s bench, and directed in the king’s name to the judges or officers of inferior courts, commanding them to certify or to return the records or proceedings in a cause depending before them, for the purpose of a judicial review of their action. The underlying policy is that all inferior courts and authorities have only limited jurisdiction or powers and serving to keep “all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority … [protecting] the liberty of the subject, by speedy and summary interposition”[8]. This is the concern of the Crown, for the sake of orderly administration of justice, but it is a private complaint which sets the Crown in motion[9]‘).”
“In this landmark case… the Decision of the Victoria Police inquiry officer has been quashed. This is a significant win for the plaintiff and for so many more individuals in Victoria and across Australia, who were unfairly and unjustly treated during one of the most challenging times in our history. The lives of these employees and their families, impacted by such organisational policies and decisions, undoubtably resulted in lifelong effects. This case not only reaffirms our faith in the justice system, it reflects the courageous and tenacious character it takes to stand up for your rights in pursuing justice;” commented Principal Lawyer Irene Chrisopoulidis at Chrisopoulidis & Associates that represented the plaintiff.
In Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Patterson [2024] VCC 487, CR 21-01818, CR 22-02373, Her Honor Judge Liz Gaynor ruled at [69] “I am satisfied that [armed Police] Officers… were the aggressors in the situation and that they employed unjustified violence‘ and [66] “[armed] police used unnecessary and unwarranted force and violence” in the violent response captured on the police’s body-worn cameras that showed the accused reacting to “unlawful violence instigated” by police, “they (police) simply confronted, pushed, and attacked him before bringing him to the ground…” Her Honor ruled at [94] “on its face that [police] evidence is inadmissible” and at [92] “I am satisfied that by their unlawful violence police instigated the response by the accused which underlies the charges (including ‘assaulting an emergency worker on duty, common law assault and resisting an emergency worker on duty’) they now face“. The charges were scheduled to be withdrawn by the Victoria Office of Public Prosecutions. The comments by Judge Gaynor in relation to the violations of non-derogable rights of the Charter of Human Rights, specifically ss21 and 22. suggest there’s a need for a wide-ranging independent inquiry such as a Royal Commission. Source: Herald Sun & Channel 7; Daily Mail and The Daily Declaration.
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Patterson [2024] VCC 487
[79] “The defence have relied on s138(1)(b) of the Evidence Act (Vic) [2008] [NSW, Cth 1995] which states that “Evidence which was obtained in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way the evidence had been obtained.”
[84] “In the decision of R v Kaba [2014] VSC 52, evidence of offending which was consequent upon and reactive to unlawful action by a police officer towards an accused was objected to by the defence as inadmissible evidence pursuant to s138(1)(b).“
[87] At paragraph 338 His Honour stated: ‘In the present case the evidence concerned is evidence of Mr Kaba’s offending. It was contended for him that the evidence was obtained in consequence of the improper or unlawful conduct of [armed] police because the offending itself occurred in consequence of that conduct.‘
[88] ‘Under s138(1)(b) obtaining evidence of offending which was itself caused by impropriety or contravention can be characterised as obtaining evidence in consequence of that impropriety or contravention‘.
[90] In Slater (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 213… “Conversely exclusion of evidence closely connected to the impropriety or contravention might more obviously serve the public interest in deterring the obtaining of evidence in that manner’.”
[91] “During the pre-trial hearing I was very much of the view and I expressed it on a number of occasions to defence counsel, that s138 was limited to the contravention or impropriety being attached to the mode of collection of the evidence if you like. Having reconsidered the matter and having had regard to these authorities, I am however satisfied there was a chain of causation between [armed] police impropriety in the form of unlawful violence perpetrated on [the unarmed accused] and the evidence of the alleged offending by the accused.“
[92] “I am satisfied as I have said that the accused’s actions were in direct response to the unlawful violence perpetrated by [armed] police… but for that violence the alleged offending would not have occurred. I am satisfied that violence constituted an impropriety pursuant to s138 and that the evidence of the accused’s actions were obtained in consequence of that impropriety.
[98] “…the gravity of the impropriety was concerning involving as it did the unjustified infliction of violence by [armed] police who bear particular responsibility by reason of their office and the powers imposed in them, and in a situation where their numbers greatly exceeded the group of [unarmed] persons involved… It was in my view clear from the footage that the numbers… were vastly exceeded by the number of [armed] police present.“
[99] “…at the very least in my view the impropriety by [armed] police was reckless. The actions of… the [unarmed] accused during the day presented no threat to [armed] police and did not warrant the violence they eventually inflicted… Given the briefing police received… it should also have been clear to [armed] police that in treating [the unarmed accused] as they did, they would most likely incite responsive action…“
[100] “Additionally, I am satisfied that [armed] police were cavalier in the way they delivered information to those [unarmed] men they had arrested of the grounds for that arrest. This was well beyond the permissible time limit or opportunities said by the authorities to constitute an appropriate period of time for information about the grounds for arrest to be made known to the subject of that arrest.“
[101] “In relation to… the unlawfulness of the arrest of [the unarmed accused] referring to the Charter of Human Rights, specifically ss21 and 22. Section 21 deals with the right to liberty and security. S21(2) states a person must not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. I am satisfied that in the way that [armed] police behaved towards [the unarmed accused], he was subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.“
[102] Further s21(3) states a person must not be deprived of that person’s liberty except on grounds and in accordance with procedures established by law. I am satisfied that [armed] police failed to have regard to the grounds and procedures established by law in the way they arrested…”
[104] “…the difficulty of obtaining the evidence without the impropriety. In my view this evidence would not have come into existence but for the impropriety I have found.
[105] “In all the circumstances I am satisfied that the evidence was obtained in consequence of an impropriety [s138(3)(f) ‘or contravention was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights set out in Schedule 2 to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 of the Commonwealth’] and it is also my view the undesirability of admitting this evidence obtained as it was as a direct result of unlawful [armed] police violence outweighs the desirability of admitting it.“
[106] “As I have said, I rule that this evidence is inadmissible at trial. That includes both the video footage and the statements by [armed] police.“
Griffith law school’s Prof Susan Harris Rimmer – an advocate of the Human Rights Act – said it put senior public servants “on notice” about human rights.
The doctrine of ultra vires is expressed in South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373, 408 (Chief Justice Latham, HCA 1942, First Uniform Tax Case, (Act without Royal Assent)): “A pretended law [mandate, regulation, contract, code, rule, act or statute] made in excess of power is not and never has been a law at all. Anybody in the country is entitled to disregard it. Naturally he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour – but such a decision is not an element which produces any invalidity in any law. The law is not valid until a court pronounces against it – and thereafter invalid. If it is beyond power it is invalid ab initio.“ See also, Riverina Transport Pty Ltd v Victoria (1937) 57 CLR 327, 342 (Latham CJ). “All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void.” Chief Justice Marshall wrote that: “[A] legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; […] an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void. […]” Cf. Marbury vs. Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, 5 US (2 Cranch) 137, 138, 174, 176, (1803). The doctrine has been recently acknowledged by the Court in Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22, 42 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ quoting Norton v Shelby County, (1886) 118 US 425, 442 (Field J)) (‘Haskins’): ‘an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.’
In a Senate hearing on 1 February of this year [2024], Human rights lawyer Peter Fam, of Sydney law firm Maat’s Method testified that a range of human rights were violated by vaccine mandates and other aspects of Australia’s pandemic response, which he said warranted investigation in a Covid Royal Commission.
The Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRCA), Schedule 2, (Australian Treaty Series 1980 No. 23) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7 states:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free CONSENT to MEDICAL or scientific EXPERIMENTATION.“
The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), sect. 10 Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment etc
(1) No-one may be—
(a) tortured; or
(b) treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.
(2) No-one may be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without their free consent.
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth.), Section 83.4 that relates to interfering with political liberty states “Any person who, by violence or by threats or intimidation of any kind, hinders or interferes with the free exercise or performance, by any other person of any political right or duty shall be guilty of an offence”.
The Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth) – Schedule 4, Article 32 – Prohibition of corporal punishment, torture, etc. “The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.“
Customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Rule 90. Torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, are prohibited.
Summary
State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.
“The prohibition of torture was already recognized in the Lieber Code.[1] The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg included “ill-treatment” of civilians and prisoners of war as a war crime.[2] Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” of civilians and persons hors de combat.[3] Torture and cruel treatment are also prohibited by specific provisions of the four Geneva Conventions.[4] In addition, “torture or inhuman treatment” and “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and are war crimes under the Statute of the International Criminal Court.[5]“
Allegations of torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, whether in international or non-international armed conflicts, have invariably been condemned by the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly and UN Commission on Human Rights, as well as by regional organizations and International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.[14] Such allegations have generally been denied by the authorities concerned.[15]
The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is to be found in general human rights treaties,[16] as well as in specific treaties that seek to prevent and punish these practices.[17] This prohibition is non-derogable under these instruments.
Rule 92. Mutilation, medical or scientific experiments or any other medical procedure not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned and not consistent with generally accepted medical standards are prohibited.
Summary
“State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”
UNESCO statement on Bioethics and Human Rights
Article 6, Section 1, states: “Any preventative diagnostic and therapeutic medical intervention is only to be carried out with the prior free and informed consent of the person concerned, based on adequate information. The consent should, where appropriate, be express and may be withdrawn by the person concerned at any time and for any reason, without disadvantage and without prejudice”.
Article 6, Section 3, states: “In no case should a collective community agreement or the consent of a community leader or other authority substitute for an individual’s informed consent.”
Nuremberg Code (1947)
Article 1, states: “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.”
Article 10, states: “During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.”
Principles of International Law Recognized in the (London) Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted by the International Law Commission, 1950. Nüremberg Principles for International Crimes against peace, War crimes and Crimes against humanity.
In the words of the chief American prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials in 1946, Robert Jackson:
“No regime that seeks the extermination of entire groups of people generally retains written proof of their intent to commit this crime. Considering the murderous nature of their regime, there is no need, since such extermination is not considered a crime. Nevertheless, even such a system seeks to fog and dissimulate the evidence, especially during wartime … The proof of crimes against humanity generally lies not in documents but in the witness of survivors, in mass graves, and in the implied proof of the intent to commit these crimes contained in the everyday and institutionalized laws (statutes), attitudes and norms of the murderous regime.”
Cf. “There, every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by his fellowmen without his consent.” Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338 (1796) 2 S.E. .70. [p. 17-18], U.S. Supreme Court.
“The right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation…” Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928); Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338 (1796) 2 S.E. .70. [p. 17-18], U.S. Supreme Court.
“For their rock is not as our Rock, even our enemies themselves being judges.” Deu. 32:31.
“Pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca admitted the claims in court documents lodged in February and is withdrawing its COVID-19 [global experimental clinical trial] vaccines worldwide amid its ongoing court case… It follows a court admission on April 30 that Vaxzevria had induced the dangerous side effects of thrombosis – caused by excessive blood clotting – and a rare condition called thrombocytopenia syndrome (TTS) in some people.”
“It’s a 47% . . . increased effort going on in the cardiac cells of vaccinated people compared to unvaccinated people! This terrible, nefarious thing, in which lots are different one place to another, that’s a plan. They didn’t accidentally make one lot worse than the other. It was purposely done… It didn’t happen by accident!” — Source Interview: Dr. Chris Shoemaker
COVID Vaccine Mandates Ruled Unconstitutional
A federal court just ruled against the constitutionality of COVID-19 vaccines mandates. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals (one rung below the U.S. Supreme Court) ruled the Los Angeles United School District (LAUSD), which required teachers and other employees to get the COVID-19 jab “or lose their jobs interfered with their fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.” The 9th Circuit reversed a lower court’s ruling in Health Freedom Defense Fund (HFDF) v. Alberto Carvalho [superintendent of LAUSD], No. 22-55908 (9th Cir. 2024).
On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The court found that Jacobson did not apply because the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the COVID-19 “vaccine” is not a vaccine, does not effectively prevent the spread of COVID-19, did not stop infection, did not stop transmission, or provide immunity and as such, the public was willfully misled, which is a crime.” Article source.
“Law Professor Dr. Francis Boyle, Who Drafted the (U.S.) 1989 Biological Weapons and Antiterrorism Act, Claims COVID-19 mRNA Injections are Weapons of Mass Destruction in New Affidavit.” (June 9th, 2024.) Source: Gateway Pundit. “The case is now in the appellate (Florida Supreme) court. The Appellate Brief was filed on Memorial Day, May 27th, 2024.”
In State of Kansas v Pfizer Inc., the State of Kansas Attorney General has filed a lawsuit against Pfizer alleging ‘false and misleading marketing‘ over the ‘safety and effectiveness‘ of its COVID-19 vaccine, “even though it knew its COVID-19 vaccine was connected to serious adverse events, including myocarditis and pericarditis, failed pregnancies, and deaths.” In a multi-state effort the State of Texas Attorney General has filed a similar pending lawsuit against Pfizer’s “claims of its shot being 95 percent effective” also alleging the claims were ‘misleading marketing’. Source: The Hill.
New York state Supreme Court ordered all New York City employees who were fired for not being vaccinated to be reinstated with back pay.
State Supreme Court found that “being vaccinated does not prevent an individual from contracting or transmitting COVID-19.”
“Many of those fired were police officers and firefighters.”
Published October 25, 2022. Source: https://www.foxnews.com/us/new-york-supreme-court-reinstates-all-employees-fired-being-unvaccinated-orders-backpay
Top Law Professor: COVID Was a Nuremberg Crime and a Crime Against Humanity
Speaking during an interview with Media Blackout’s Maria Zeee, one of the most prominent law professors in the world has just declared that “everyone involved” in pushing Covid mRNA shots onto the public committed “crimes against humanity.” Dr. Francis Boyle, the architect of the 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, did not mince his words.
Dr. Francis Boyle asserted that the “frankenshots” were part of a plan to conduct “medical experimentation” on humanity. He says, “Everyone involved in the development of COVID-19 as ‘an offensive biological warfare weapon’ and also everyone involved in the manufacture of these COVID-19 ‘frankenshots’ clearly violated the Nuremberg Code on medical experimentation. It was a Nuremberg crime and a crime against humanity.”
Dr. Boyle also responded to the Kansas lawsuit against Pfizer as “promising,” but the issue is that it is a civil lawsuit, not a criminal one.
Dr. Boyle declared that the perpetrators are guilty of “murder and conspiracy to commit murder” for causing deaths through vaccine injuries. He emphasized that under common law Anglo-American principles of criminal law, which he taught for eight years, those involved are undoubtedly guilty.
Other crimes include “not only murder but also mayhem and assault and battery,” he says.
Boyle doubled down during the interview after he recently signed a sworn affidavit in a Florida case involving an “Emergency Petition for a Writ of Mandamus” to declare that Covid mRNA injections are not vaccines and are “weapons of mass destruction” that violate the law he wrote on bioweapons – the 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act.
“It is my expert opinion that ‘COVID-19 nanoparticle injections’ or ‘mRNA nanoparticle injections’ or ‘COVID-19 injections meet the criteria of biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction according to Biological Weapons 18 USC § 175; Weapons and Firearms § 790.166 Fla.Stat. (2023),” Boyle explained.
He continued by warning that “mRNA is very powerful stuff to inject into your body.”
The professor notes that the injections “could discombobulate your entire genetic system.”
“Well, that is what is happening now,” he lamented.
Boyle added that it is already been evidenced by “an explosion of sudden deaths and disabilities.”
Source: Vigilant News; Slay News.
The High Court has found Qantas guilty of illegally sacking 1,700 workers during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Justice Michael Lee said he hoped “some common sense could prevail” as he ordered the union and Qantas to mediate about the total amount payable to unlawfully sacked.
“Apart from any public benefit, finality would help bring a degree of closure to those affected workers who have been wronged, particularly for those who experienced emotional and financial stress.”
Breaking News 25.10.2024.
Hundreds of former and current police officers and staff members who were unlawfully directed to get COVID-19 vaccines launched a class action lawsuit against the state government and the Queensland Police Service, over its COVID-19 vaccine mandates.
The lawsuit seeking compensation, filed in the Supreme Court in Brisbane today, is being funded by billionaire Clive Palmer.
The class actions follow the global precedent set by Mr Palmer in February after the Queensland Supreme Court ruled that COVID-19 mandates breached the human rights laws of some frontline workers when he funded a successful challenge to the Queensland Government’s vaccine mandates on behalf of frontline workers.
In his written decision in February, Justice Glenn Martin ruled the directives breached section 58 of the Human Rights Act, which stated that all public service employees must give proper consideration to human rights before making a decision, and that they must act and make decisions that are compatible with human rights.
“There is no question of liability given the Queensland Supreme Court’s ruling in February that COVID-19 mandates breached the human rights laws of frontline workers, a decision the Queensland Government did not challenge.
“We are standing up for the 300-plus police and paramedics seeking compensation from the State of Queensland due to many people losing their jobs, being injured by the COVID-19 vaccines and being unlawfully disciplined for not following the vaccine directions set by the Queensland police and ambulance services,” Mr Palmer said.
Source: ABC News